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The EU’s normative power in changing world politics 
Ian Manners1 
Professor 





The future of world politics is defined by four catastrophic failures – the failure of the neo-
liberal economic system; the failure to keep global warming below a 2 degree Celsius 
increase in mean temperatures; the failure to reach any of the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goals; and the failure to develop any meaningful form of global governance 
capable of addressing these, and other failures. Numerous national, European and global 
‘security strategies’ / ‘risk assessments’ identify proliferation of conventional arms and 
weapons of mass destruction; terrorism, state failure, organised crime and cyber security; 
energy security, climate change, and changing demographics as the greatest challenges of 
the post-cold war era.2 Undoubtedly all of these are important, but they are mainly 
symptoms rather than causes of global failures. If the notion of changing world politics is to 
bring any global governance at all, rather than simply reverting to 19th century ‘great power’ 
politics, then addressing the root causes of 21st century crises – the economic system, global 
warming, development goals, and global justice needs to be rethought. 
 
This chapter sets out what role the European Union (EU) could and should play in this 
changing world politics, with an emphasis on the concept of ‘normative power’. To do this 
the chapter addresses five interrelated questions regarding the normative power and 
external politics of the EU in any new global order: 1. what is the concept of normative 
power in world politics? 2. what is an effective EU toolbox for tackling new challenges? 3. 
How does the EU go beyond self-perception and rhetoric? 4. what is the raison d'être of the 
EU?, and 5. How might normative power in EU external policies lead to a more just global 
order? 
 
Normative power is understood in this chapter in its ‘ideal or purest form’, that is in the 
absence of other forms of power such as material incentives or physical force. Clearly, in 
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practical realities normative power and normative justification co-exist alongside other 
forms of influence and power in world politics and in EU external actions. The question then 
becomes how ideal or pure forms of normative power are best conceived and practiced in 
the presence of material incentives and/or physical force. It is obviously not possible to 
address this question in any comprehensive way in this brief chapter, but it is suggested that 
understanding and prioritising normative power may help ensure that any subsequent or 
simultaneous use of material incentives and/or physical force is practiced in a more 
justifiable and reflexive way. 
 
This chapter focuses on justification in EU external actions rather than explanation, interests 
or incentives. Normative political theorists such as Andreas Føllesdal or Molly Cochran place 
an emphasis on justification as providing criteria or means of overcoming distinctions 
between self and self-less interest and concerns (see Manners 2010). Føllesdal has 
identified justifiability as one of the fundamental conceptions of what legitimacy is about in 
normative political theory. He argues for a concern ‘about the normative legitimacy of the 
EU, often expressed in terms of justifiability among political equals’ (Føllesdal 2006: 156, 
emphasis in original). Similarly, Cochran argues that it is ‘a task of normative IR theory to 
inquire into the value invested in this norm [respect for state sovereignty] and to determine 
whether it is justifiable’ (Cochran 1999: 10). Thus in this chapter the term ‘justifiable’’ is 
used as a means of capturing the way in which moral claims are put forward rather than 
their universal or particular scope (Cochran 1999: 14). Such means involves attempting to 
ensure that EU relations and policies with the rest of the world are explicable and justifiable 
to first, second and third parties – the EU, its citizens and other non-EU parties. 
 
 
1. The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics 
 
The social sciences have many different understandings of ‘normative power’. The purpose 
of this section is to help clarify the concept of normative power in world politics as 
developed in European Union (EU) studies over the last ten years. The section uses a five-
point conceptualisation of normative power as being ideational; involving principles, 
actions, and impact; as well as having broader consequences in world politics. For each 
point both a general observation about world politics and a specific comment about the EU 
is made (see Keene 2008; Forsberg 2009). 
 
The past two decades have seen rapid and radical transformations of global economy, 
society, environment, conflict, and politics. During this period three events in particular 
seem to capture these notions of global transformation – the 1989 collapse of communism, 
the 2001 terrorist attacks, and the 2008 global financial crisis. The beliefs of eastern 
Europeans in 1989, al-Qaida terrorists in 2001, and financial investors in 2008 all 
contributed, in very different ways, to a transformation of international order and the 
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emergence of new global agendas. These events and the transformations they led to say 
something about the power of ideas and ideation in world politics. 
 
Ideational 
The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than 
material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justification rather than the 
use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly the use of normative justification implies 
a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics. In this respect, 
relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively sustainable’ – i.e. 
‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; ‘sustainable’ into the next generation. To 
capture the sea change in global thinking that the concept of normative power implies, it is 
useful to juxtapose two visual metaphors (borrowed from Jonathan Power’s Story of 
Amnesty International and from Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now respectively) - 
normative power works like ‘water on stone’, not like ‘napalm in the morning’. 
 
In the post-Cold War period the power of ideas and ideation have been influential in the 
evolution of the European Community into the EU. Such ideas have helped create an EU 
which is concerned about more than economic policies, and which exercises more than 
material forms of influence and power (see Manners 2000, 2002). In this respect, the 
incorporation of normative power and exercise of normative justification can be increasingly 
found in much of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world including the external 
dimensions of internal policies; enlargement, trade, and development policies; and external 
relations more generally. Two examples of the power of ideas and ideation in post-Cold War 
EU relations with the world include the idea of ‘sustainable development’ and of 
‘humanitarian intervention’. In both cases the ideas came from within the UN system, were 




Conceptualising normative power as ideational non-material justification involves a three-
part understanding of its use and analysis linking principles, actions, and impact (Manners 
2008a, 2009). Normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles 
being promoted. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the 
principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a 
coherent and consistent way. Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from 
previously established international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if 
these are important within the UN system. Coherence of principles comes from the extent 
to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, can be seen to be sound and 
non-contradictory. Consistency of principles comes from the extent to which differing 
principles, and practices to promote them, are uniform both within and without the 




Principles in the EU and its relations with the rest of the world draw upon the principles of 
the UN Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on 
Human Rights. In practical terms such principles can be differentiated into the prime 
principle of sustainable peace; core principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and 
rule of law (as set out in article 6 of the Treaty on European Union); as well as the objectives 
and tasks of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance (as 
set out in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and article 2 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community). Coherence and consistency in the international promotion of 
these principles is intended to come from the role of a High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Actions 
Normative power should secondly be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to 
promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the 
actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or 
shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive 
engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multi- and 
pluri-lateral dialogue between participants. Within these international and domestic venues 
for dialogue, debate and argumentation can involve reference to international principles as 
well as encouraging understanding and agreement (although also misunderstanding and 
disagreement). Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of 
prestige or shame by participants. The attribution of prestige may range from public 
declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution 
of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning. 
 
EU actions in the promotion of principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, 
encouraging a more holistic, or comprehensive approach to the many challenges of world 
politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges 
through development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and 
enlargement. In the past decade the gradual evolution of conflict prevention and crisis 
management policies has helped improve EU ability to deal with more immediate 
challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction. This combination 
of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy where the EU is 
able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the 
EU’s inclination in the promotion of principles is not structural capacity or crisis ability, but 
its encouragement of processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entails 
initiating and institutionalising regular patterns of communication or partnership, for 
example through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and Strategic 
Partnerships.  
 
Alternative approaches to the promotion of principles might include more extensive use of 
material incentives such as positive conditionality or negative conditionality and robust 
sanctions. But concerns regarding efficacy and ethicacy of applying sanctions, or 
withdrawing trade preferences, to some of the world’s poorest peoples raises questions 
about more extensive use of material incentives (Manners 2009c: 794-5; Financial Times 
2009). Clara Portela suggests that EU sanctions have geographical priorities, involve only 
‘targeted sanctions’, and involve new ‘modes of operation’ involving mutual 
accommodation (Council 2004; Portela 2005; Portela 2009). Portela’s research illustrates 
the way in which EU use of material incentives such as sanctions policy also appears 
increasingly shaped by the need to encourage processes of engagement and dialogue. 
 
Impact 
Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socialising in the impact of the actions 
taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, 
then its impact must be involve socialisation, partnership, and ownership. Socialisation as an 
impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be seen as being part of an 
open-ended process of engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact of 
the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalised relationships created by 
the participating parties whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. 
Ownership as an impact of the promotion of principles involves practices of joint or local 
ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. However, such impacts of 
normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic 
socialisation is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational, and international 
support for international principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative 
justification conceived here. An example of longer-term socialisation impact can be seen in 
Alexander Warkotsch’s work on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia in which he argues 
for ‘a more long-term approach that concentrates on the break-up of authoritarian 
structures by emphasising certain equality rights and government accountability…. With the 
overall aim of restructuring socialisation efforts along the criteria of target accessibility and 
programme appreciation’ (Warkotsch 2009: 269). 
 
EU impact in promoting principles can be extraordinarily difficult to judge (see Manners 
2009b, 2009c). Clarity of principle is important in ensuring others understand what the EU is 
trying to promote, as with the idea of ‘never again’ in the post-Yugoslav space. Simplicity of 
action space is important when the EU, albeit very rarely, is the only or predominant actor, 
as with the pre-accession processes of the 1990s. Consistency of promotion is crucial to 
ensure the EU avoids claims of ‘double standards’, as is often the case in state recognition 
(such as Kosovo) or UN resolutions (such as the Middle East). Holistic, ‘joined-up’ thinking is 
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important in the broader promotion of principles through the multilateral system, such as 
the many challenges of the Doha Round of trade liberalisation, the Millennium Development 
Goals, and addressing climate change at the Copenhagen CoP15. Partnership, not EU 
unilateralism is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral 
institutions. Finally, timescale is important when attempting to judge EU principles, actions 
and impact in any normatively sustainable way. 
 
Consequences 
A belief in, and practice of, normative power has three broader consequences concerning 
the possibility of more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable world politics. The concept of 
normative power invites more holistic thinking, ‘outside the box’, about the purposes of 
agency, power, and policy in world politics. Such holistic thinking demands more thorough 
consideration of the rationale/principles, practices/actions, and consequences/impact of 
actors/agents in world politics. The concept of normative power is conceived here in its 
ideal or purest form, but in practical terms it is often used together with material incentives 
and/or physical force. However, the prioritising of normative power may help ensure that 
any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and 
utilised in a more justifiable way. Finally, the concept of normative power with its emphasis 
on holistic thinking and justifiable practices raises the possibility that a more sustainable 
world politics embraces both the power of ideas, the ‘thinkable’, and physical power, the 
‘material’. 
 
The European Union has a history of, and capacity for, the practice of normative power in 
world politics, but three challenges remain. The evolution of EU politics and policies over 
the past decade has occasionally copied some of the technologies and habits of other actors 
in world politics, for instance in the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘securitisation’ of ordinary life, or 
in trying to rival other ‘great powers’ in international relations. Such technologies and habits 
tend to involve copying other ‘boxes’, not inviting more holistic thinking ‘outside the box’. In 
this respect, the development and use of EU material incentives and/or physical force has 
tended to follow the patterns and practices of ‘great powers’ instead of thinking about and 
using normative power in a more justifiable way. To address these tendencies and better 
prepare for the challenges of the 21st century the EU should return to making creative 
efforts to ensure that global challenges, as with endemic war in Europe, become ‘not merely 




2. An effective toolbox for tackling new challenges?  
 
Having clarified the concept of normative power in world politics, it is worth asking what an 
effective EU toolbox for tackling the new challenges identified in the opening paragraph 
7 
 
would look like. To what extent and under what conditions may normative power offer the 
EU an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities taking into account 
new challenges? The first response to this question is to seek to further identify what, 
exactly, these new challenges are – here it may be possible to differentiate between 
international and transnational challenges. New international challenges tend to focus anew 
on ‘great power’ relations relating to the rise of ‘new powers’, a shift of wealth and 
economic capabilities from the west to the east, and questions of coming multipolarity from 
the G8 to the G20. In contrast, new transnational challenges are of a much greater 
magnitude, including economic globalisation and the crisis of the global economic system; 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global terrorism, organised crime and cyber 
security; energy security, food security and climate change; changing patterns of migration; 
and the role of non-state actors in all of these challenges. Both international and 
transnational challenges are amplified by the inability to address growing inequality within 
and between societies, as well as the inability to reform a UN system created for a long-
passed world. 
 
The second response is to try to discern the conditions which characterise this rapidly 
emerging era of new challenges – here conditions of complexity and interconnectedness are 
especially relevant. The evolving EU consensus on new challenges and foreign policy 
appears to recognise these conditions, with the 2008 Council ‘Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy’ (RIESS) arguing that ‘globalisation has 
also made threats more complex and interconnected’ (Solana 2008: 1). The 2003 ‘European 
Security Strategy’ (ESS) contended that in the post-cold war world ‘no single country is able 
to tackle today's complex problems on its own’, with the RIESS observing that ‘five years on, 
these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex’ and 
concluding that ‘twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats 
and challenges’ (Solana 2008: 3 and 1). The ESS and RIESS suggest that complexity is 
greatest in three areas – counter-terrorism, Mediterranean relations, and ESDP. The 2003 
acknowledgement in the ESS that terrorism arose out of ‘complex causes’, including ‘the 
pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young 
people living in foreign societies’ (Solana 2003: 3), appeared to recognise the complexity of 
addressing new transnational challenges in the post-cold war world. Five years later, the 
RIESS suggested that the Mediterranean still posed ‘complex challenges’ for the EU, 
including ‘insufficient political reform and illegal migration’ (Solana 2008: 7). The RIESS also 
acknowledged the difficulties for the ESDP in answering the demand for assistance and 
arguing that ‘the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be’ 
(Solana 2008: 9). 
 
In parallel the evolving EU foreign policy consensus also appears to recognise the second 
condition of the interconnectedness of new challenges. While the ESS and RIESS tend to 
refer to interconnectedness and interdependency in terms of terrorist threats and energy 
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security, the 2006 ‘European Consensus on Development’ (ECD) talks in terms of 
globalisation and poverty eradication. These conditions of interdependency and 
interconnectedness are illustrated by the ESS’s reference to the new global challenges that 
‘have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected 
infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields’ (Solana 2003: 2). In this 
context, the ESS identified the new challenges of global terrorism as ‘increasingly, terrorist 
movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use 
unlimited violence to cause massive casualties’ (Solana 2003: 3). In addition, the ESS and 
RIESS placed increasingly emphasis on the new challenge of energy security and 
interdependence - ‘energy dependence is a special concern for Europe’ and ‘concerns about 
energy dependence have increased over the last five years’ (Solana 2003: 3; 2008: 5). The 
ECD went beyond talking in terms of threat and security to discuss ‘The context within 
which poverty eradication is pursued is an increasingly globalised and interdependent 
world; this situation has created new opportunities but also new challenges’ (European 
Parliament, Council, Commission [EPCC] 2006: 1). The ECD appeared to recognise that 
‘combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more 
stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its 
richer and poorer countries’ (EPCC 2006: 1). The ECD also suggested that EU responses to 
new challenges must involve the promotion of ‘understanding of interdependence and 
encourage North-South solidarity’ and involve providing agricultural resources to assist 
developing countries ‘dependent on commodities’ (EPCC 2006: 9 and 13). 
 
The acknowledgement of conditions of complexity and connectedness in tackling new 
international and transnational challenges leads to the question of whether, and to what 
extent, normative power provides the EU with an effective toolbox of foreign policy 
instruments and capabilities. Coming to terms with such conditions and challenges demands 
the clear and coherent fusion of the EU’s acquis communautaire to its external strategy. 
While the acquis holds the principles which might provide an effective box, it has not yet 
been strategically filled and organised with EU foreign policy tools. The Lisbon Treaty 
intends to take a step in this direction by linking together the promotion of values and 
principles from the acquis with its ‘action on the international scene’ through external 
actions and CFSP. With or without the Lisbon Treaty efforts to promote principles of the UN 
Charter and international law, as well as the identified values and principles, are likely to fail 
unless the means of promotion is more systematic and sustainable than the current treaties 
suggest. Such systematic promotion would require that any reforms ensured consistency 
and coherence within and between the different areas of EU external actions as policies are 
developed and implemented. Such sustainable promotion would require, as suggested 
above, the prioritising of normative power over material incentives and/or physical force to 
ensure that the EU is equipped with an effective, normatively sustainable, toolbox for 




Beyond problems of the Lisbon Treaty, its implementation, and its sustainable promotion, 
remains very big questions over the role of member states and the readiness of the EU for 
the catastrophic failures outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Even if the EU were willing 
and able to implement reforms, and engage in systematic and sustainable promotion, would 
the EU then have an effective foreign policy toolbox for tackling new global challenges? 
Possibly not, as it is likely that in the short and narrow term most member states are 
incapable of taking the steps needed to deal with, for example, systemic economic crises, 
global sea-level rises, pandemic poverty, and the realisation of structures of global 
governance. This endemic structural problem means that most member states have too 
short, narrow and inward views to be able to adapt quick enough to the new global 
challenges in order to avoid fast encroaching crises. Added to these problems association 
with the role of member states, is the simple observation that even implemented, the 
Lisbon Treaty is ‘a pre-crisis treaty for a post-crisis world’ (Münchau 2009). Wolfgang 
Münchau argues that the institutional and legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty do not address 
what he sees as the EU’s three main defects: ‘its ability to co-ordinate during a crisis, its 
failure to enact policies to strengthen its potential growth, and its failure to project itself 
effectively at a global level’. Clearly, even with the Lisbon Treaty enacted, Münchau believes 
that ‘the treaty’s institutional and legal changes offer little comfort’ for the EU’s inability to 
co-ordinate. In many respects this is problematic, but not unexpected – its hybrid polity 
consisting of extensive intergovernmental practices in the external relations arena ensures 
ongoing difficulties of co-ordination, implementation and effectiveness. In sum, even if 
foreign policy reforms were implemented, it is highly likely that problems within member 
states and weaknesses within the EU configuration itself would not provide an effective 
toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. Fusing together acquis with strategy 
with the use of normative power would represent one step towards more normatively 
sustainable EU external actions, but this alone is unlikely to be enough to tackle new global 
challenges under conditions of complexity and connectedness.  
 
 
3. Going beyond self-perception and rhetoric?  
 
Alongside the empirical question of effectiveness is the normative question of whether the 
concept of normative power takes the EU beyond self-perception and rhetoric. In order to 
answer this question, it is necessary to discuss notions of ‘beyond’, ‘perception’, and 
‘rhetoric’. Firstly, there is the question of going beyond perception and discourse in order to 
objectively assess the EU for evidence of convenient self-perception and discourses of 
political rhetoric. The alchemic quest for a means of going beyond perception and discourse 
has long been the aim of empiricist and positivist approaches which seek objectivity in the 
subjective social world. The difficulties of going beyond can be seen in the attempts to 
quantitatively measure the gap between capabilities and expectations in EU foreign policy, 
as well as the attempts to qualitatively judge how normative the EU is compared to other 
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foreign policy actors. In both these examples the analytical difficulties of objectively 
assessing gaps and normativity render such studies problematic. Ultimately, as most critical 
scholars observe, ‘those engaged in positivist approaches … cannot avoid normative 
assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in 
articulating why such research is significant’ (Cochran, 1999: 1).  
 
By admitting that normative assumptions are unavoidable, a step may be taken towards 
understanding the importance of perception and discourse in the construction of the EU as 
an actor in world politics. Perception, discourse and identity construction are deeply 
implicated in the study of the EU in world politics, and require analytical techniques 
appropriate to understanding their role. Whether using social constructivist, critical 
theoretical or post-structural approaches, the examination of EU perception and discourse 
requires an interpretive understanding of how subjects see their world. Understanding the 
role of perception and discourse in the concept of normative power necessitates the use of 
‘longitudinal interpretation’. The practice of longitudinal interpretation is important for a 
normative power analysis as it suggests that time and technique are factors that could 
improve our understanding of the EU in world politics. A long analytical time frame ensures 
that analysis captures generational change rather than momentary fluctuation – ideally any 
study would include at least the origins of principles, their translation into actions, and the 
impact and consequences of these actions. This is important because the normative power 
approach ‘works interpretively’ in that it is ‘interested in the level of meaning and believes 
that social science is about providing various phenomena with content and meaning. 
Interpretations contain elements of both understanding and explanation’ in this approach 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 136). 
By using the analytical practice of longitudinal interpretation, the method of ‘tripartite 
analysis’ facilitates the study of rhetoric, perception, discourse and identity in EU external 
actions. Tripartite analysis involves interpreting the construction of principles, actions and 
impact as EU policies are created and recreated. The analysis requires looking at how all 
three parts of the actions shape and feed into each other over long time frames, as well as 
applying normative critiques. Such critiques require comparing the EU with other examples 
at all three stages within the method of the tripartite analysis, as well as comparing claims 
of principles against the aims of actions and the consequences of impact. In this way the 
construction of ‘convenient self-perceptions’ and ‘political rhetoric’ can be analysed and 
critiqued for the longer-term power and inconvenience of such perceptions and rhetorical 
techniques. 
 
Undoubtedly the processes of constructing self-perceptions and discursive rhetorical 
practices of ‘normative power’ have been important over the past 15 years. The inclusion of 
references to principles such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law during the 1990s 
has contributed to an evolving EU foreign policy consensus over much deeper international 
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principles such as human security, sustainable peace, and effective multilateralism. From a 
short-term, one-dimensional understanding of power the constructions and discourses 
advocating promotion and adherence to such principles may appear as convenient and 
‘mere’ rhetoric. But it is equally likely that such perceptions and rhetoric may prove 
inconvenient and persuasive over the longer term and with a more multi-dimensional 
understanding of power. The rising importance of human security within the discursive 
construction of EU external relations and security strategy has accelerated over the past 
decade (see discussions of human security in Manners 2006a, 2006b). As the RIESS 
acknowledged in 2008, ‘we have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and 
inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and 
addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity….We need to continue mainstreaming 
human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-
based approach coherent with the concept of human security’ (Solana 2008: 2 and 10).  
 
Similarly, the increasing importance of the principle of sustainable peace can also be seen in 
the RIESS: ‘As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there 
cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development 
and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (Solana 2008: 8; see also 
discussions of sustainable peace in Manners 2006c, 2008b). Finally, the RIESS also suggests 
the discursive importance of the principle of effective multilateralism: ‘The ESS called for 
Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world…. *But+ the 
international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on 
several fronts…. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. 
Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions’ (Solana 2008: 
11-12). While the EU profession of adherence to all three of these central UN principles is a 
fairly recent, 21st century phenomena, the significance of such discursive practices is likely 
to prove distinctly inconvenient in EU external actions. As suggested elsewhere, public 
pronunciation, discursive deployment, and inclusion into strategies and policies have ‘the 
effect of reconstituting the EU ‘habitus’ by changing the way in which socially acquired and 
embodied systems of cultural reproduction adapt to innovation and advocacy’ (Lucarelli and 
Manners 2006: 210). Furthermore, UN principles of human security and sustainable peace 
have large constituencies of support from international NGOs and global civil society, 
making it unlikely that such principles are easily forgotten from the public memory. 
Ultimately, the construction of EU normative power will likely prove inconvenient for EU 
foreign policy manoeuvrability in the longer term. 
 
In addition to these comments on going beyond and perception, is the question of the role 
of rhetoric in EU external actions. While ‘rhetoric is broadly acknowledged as an important 
feature of the political process’ with rhetoric having ‘the normative power of the argument’, 
it is still popular to discuss rhetoric as ‘empty’ in political studies. (Gottweis 2007: 240; 
Dimitrakopoulos 2008: 321). Rhetoric is best understood in its Aristotelian meaning as the 
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art of persuasion encompassing ethos (morality), logos (logic) and pathos (emotion) in 
argumentation (Leith 2009). All three elements are to found in EU rhetoric and persuasion, 
and should be considered important to the understanding of the power in ‘normative 
power’. The ethos of an argument refers to the morality of the speaker, to their character 
claim to be moral and ethical. In the concept of normative power, ethos can be seen in the 
need to legitimise principles through reference to previously established moral credentials 
such as international law or the UN Charter. The logos of an argument is the logic used by 
the speaker to appeal to reason. In the concept of normative power, logos can be seen in 
the need to act persuasively through argumentation suggesting the pros and cons of a line 
of reasoning. In EU external actions emphasising previously legitimated principles, the 
argumentative logic often refers to both the pros and cons of, for example, acting in line 
with international law or the UN Charter. The pathos of an argument is the appeal to 
emotion used by the speaker. In the concept of normative power, pathos can be seen in the 
extent to which the EU can have a socialising impact in the form of a greater social 
understanding between the EU and its partners. 
 
 
4. What is the raison d'être of the European Union?  
 
So far the discussions of the concept of normative power, the new challenges facing the EU, 
and the role of perception and rhetoric have all suggested how the EU might deploy 
normative power in changing world politics, but they have not necessarily spelt out ‘why’? 
To answer that question it is necessary to take a step backwards - to ask what the EU is for. 
What is the raison d’être of the EU?? 
 
While Europe may never have been so prosperous, so secure or so free, it does not feel this 
way to most of its citizens, its third-country residents, or those on its borders. For EU 
citizens and near-citizens, as well as most of the rest of the world, the EU seems like a 
foreign country: an unintelligible, remote, neo-liberal place where they do things differently 
to the world of first-hand experience. European unification has made peace and prosperity 
possible within Europe, but in that moment of achievement the EU has lost its way, lost its 
meaning. For EU citizens and beyond, the EU has no meaningful raison d’être, no clear 
mission 20 years after European unification, 50 years after its creation. 
At exactly the same time the EU has never been more needed, more called upon to act, 
more important in global politics. As the opening paragraph of the chapter spelt out, the 
immediate future of the world in the next two decades will be defined by the four 
catastrophic failures. The EU could contribute to addressing these failures if it were able to 
find a meaningful role in the world – to find a means of linking its institutional ‘acquis’ with 
its global ‘strategy’ in a normatively sustainable way, as discussed in section two of the 
chapter. Taking this step to finding a raison d’être, a mission, does not need and must not 
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focus on institutional or treaty reform. EU citizens and near-citizens, as well as the rest of 
the world, need and deserve more than slogans and platitudes, more than decision-making 
diagrams and unintelligible treaties.  
Finding the EU’s raison d’être in world politics involves an intellectual return to the creative 
efforts that lay at the origins of the EU. The recognition that the touchstone of the EU, of its 
acquis, holds the key to its mission and role can only be achieved by returning to the lost 
treasures of the Schuman Declaration. In the 1950s the making of creative efforts in the 
ECSC involved pooling basic production and instituting a new high authority; making war 
materially impossible and unthinkable; raising living standards and promoting peaceful 
achievements. This fusion of interests and ideas provided the intellectual origins of the EU 
as we know it – and should provide the EU’s raison d’être in world politics.  
The creative efforts needed in the 21st century must also be proportionate to the dangers 
that new global threats and challenges hold for the EU. The recognition of the fusion of 
interests and ideas within the EU is captured in the EU’s prime aim of promoting peace, 
values and well-being. It is here that clarity is needed in linking raison d’être and mission 
with the EU’s acquis and strategy in world politics. The emphasis on material interests 
through the pooling of production, making war materially impossible, and raising of living 
standards leads to the aim of promoting well-being, in other words, prosperity in Europe 
and beyond. In parallel, the emphasis on normative ideas through instituting a new high 
authority, making war unthinkable, and promoting peaceful achievements leads to the aim 
of promoting values, in other words, progress in Europe and beyond. This aim and mission 
of promoting peace, prosperity and progress inside and outside the Union provides the EU 
with a much clearer raison d’être in world politics, but it does not necessarily help provide a 
means of promotion. 
The fusion of interests and ideas in EU raison d’être is matched by the fusion of aims and 
means in promoting peace, prosperity and progress. In other words, the EU’s role, its 
perception, its strategies, and external actions are not separable – aims and means, words 
and actions, co-constitute the EU in world politics. But it is useful to think in new ways about 
EU interests and ideas in world politics by differentiating between material 
policies/instruments and normative ideas. Material interests and material/physical policies 
and instruments are central to conventional thinking about the EU as a global actor. As 
discussed in section one of the chapter, normative ideas and normative justification have 
not been considered as important, but their role and deployment as normative power is 
critical if the EU’s role, perception, strategies and actions are to become more meaningful 
and more normatively sustainable in changing world politics. 
In this respect, the EU’s raison d’être in world politics should aim to promote peace, 
prosperity and progress through the prioritisation of normative power. Only by clearly 
stating what the EU is for, its raison d’être, and how it intends to promote these aims in a 
normatively sustainable way can the EU take any step towards improving its perception 
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from outside of Europe. The strategy of clear, coherent, consistent, and committed 
normative justification that guides any subsequent use of material incentives and/or 
physical force should be deployed in order to sustain any global influence if the EU is not to 
be rendered internationally invisible in next 10-20 years. Finally, with or without the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EU must refine and develop its array of policies and instruments to ensure it 
prioritises normative justification in the promotion of peace, prosperity and progress for its 
and other peoples in the changing world politics.       
 
5. Normative power and EU external actions in changing world politics 
 
This chapter has set out what role the EU could and should play in a changing world politics 
characterised by new global challenges under conditions of complexity and 
interconnectedness. It is suggested that these challenges and conditions are likely to be 
accelerated by four catastrophic failures in the next two decades, making the need for more 
sustainable thinking on EU external actions all the more imperative.  
 
The chapter began by setting out the concept of normative power in world politics. It was 
argued that conceptualising normative power in this way helps the understanding of the 
need for the practice of normative justification in EU external actions. The chapter then 
asked what an effective EU toolbox for tackling new global challenges would need to look 
like. Here it was argued that the complexity and interconnectedness of new international, 
and more importantly, new transnational challenges demand a need for an EU external 
action toolbox that can engage in normatively sustainable mission and politics. Thirdly, the 
chapter examined how the EU might move beyond perception and rhetoric in its external 
actions. In this respect it was argued that perception, discourse and identity require a 
stronger means of understanding, and that the practice of rhetorical engagement is an 
important element of normative power. Fourthly, in order to understand why normative 
power might be important, the chapter asked what the raison d’être of the EU might be. 
The response was that the EU should return to making creative efforts to promote peace, 
prosperity and progress through the prioritisation of normative justification over material 
incentives and physical force.  
 
So how might normative power in EU external actions help in changing world politics? As 
suggested at the outset, addressing the root causes of 21st century failures and crises 
requires a radical rethink of world politics, and the EU’s role within them. More sustainable 
global economics, a more sustainable global environment, more just human development, 
and more sustainable systems of democratic global justice require different thinking and a 
different direction in national, international and transnational politics. The EU may have a 
role to play in that new direction by helping to reinvent international relations, but equally it 
may have no new role to play by reproducing traditional international relations. It is 
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perfectly plausible for the EU to become a new pole in the emerging multipolar world, to 
reproduce the ‘great power’ politics of the 19th century. If that is to be the case then we are 
likely to continue to reproduce and accelerate the great wars, great famines, genocides, 
poverty and starvation, and impending eco-catastrophe that traditional international 
relations has cultivated. 
 
Changing the direction of the development of EU external actions into more normative 
justificatory practices would lead to at least five expectations about attempting to address 
the root causes of 21st century global crises. The first expectation would be that more 
normative justificatory practices might bridge the gap between communitarian self-
interested concerns and cosmopolitan other-interested concerns. Such a bridging may 
involve moving towards ‘cosmopolitical’ approaches that seek to disentangle ‘soft 
cosmopolitanism’ from neo-liberal capitalism as part of a commitment to ‘more discursive 
engagement across lines of difference, more commitment to reduction of material 
inequality, and more openness to radical change’ (Calhoun 2003: 111). Following this first 
commitment, the second expectation would be for greater attention to principles of 
equality and social solidarity as part of a commitment to reduction of material inequality 
and more sustainable social economics in order to address the failings of the neo-liberal 
economic system. On top of these two commitments, a third expectation would be for 
greater adherence to the principle of sustainable development in order to address the 
lifestyle choices at the roots of eco-catastrophic global warming. The fourth expectation 
would be for greater consideration of the expansion of freedom as development in order to 
improve injustices in human development. Finally, the fifth expectation would be for more 
openness to radical change in global governance in order to address these, and other 
failings of the 21st century. Ultimately, any commitment to normative power and EU 
external actions in changing world politics needs to ‘profess normative values and practice 
pragmatic principles’ at the same time as maintaining ‘a clear sense of long-term objectives’ 
but acknowledging the limits of the EU’s ‘day-to-day actions’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 
214; Kay 2009: 11). 
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